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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out of 
an auto-pedestrian accident when an automobile driven by 
defendant, Jolene Jaye Simons, struck the plaintiff, Judith 
Johnson. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and judg-
ment for the plaintiffs, the defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the jury verdict and judgment, 
or that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant-appellant, Jolene Jaye Simons, while driving 
a car owned by her father, Dan C. Simons, with his knowledge 
and consent (Tr. 15) struck plaintiff-respondent, Judith Johnson, 
a pedestrian. At the time of the accident, both the defendant 
driver and the plaintiff victim were sixteen (16) years old. 
Defendant, Jolene Jaye Simons, prior to trial had married, 
and was known as Jolene Jaye McBride. She is referred to in 
the trial transcript as Mrs. McBride. 
The evidence at trial showed that the accident occurred 
on January 13, 1973, at approximately six o'clock (6:00) P.M., 
near 6350 South Highland Drive, in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
while the plaintiff-respondent, Judith Johnson, was standing 
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off the roadway and west of Highland Drive and southbound 
traffic. There were no sidewalks, no crosswalks or traffic 
control devices in the area, however, at or near the place 
where defendants' car struck the plaintiff, the area that 
comprised the shoulder of the roadway, had been asphalted to 
the west edge of the roadway, some distance north and south of 
the entrance to the Monte Cristo Condominiums. The area as-
phalted was approximately ten to fifteen feet wide, and gave 
the appearance of an additional lane of traffic southbound. 
(Tr. 8, 95). Street lighting was minimal with an additional 
light on the Monte Cristo Condominiums sales office located a 
short distance south and west of the area where the plaintiff, 
Judith Johnson, had been struck by the defendants1 automobile. 
Lighting in that area was such that Mr. Johnson could observe 
chalk marks and found small pieces of clothing without the aid 
of a flashlight. (Tr. 39-40). Oncoming traffic was heavy, 
northbound as well as southbound, the direction defendant-
appellant was travelling. Defendant testified that just before 
impact she had looked in her rear view mirror and saw several 
cars behind her and noticed at least one car directly in front 
of her? that she glanced down at her speedometer, but could 
not recall her exact speed, but thought she was travelling about 
30 miles per hour, when she looked up and saw an object which 
she hit. (Tr. 20-26) . Defendant did not perceive it was a 
person, did not swerve to avoid striking the object, and did 
not apply her brakes, except to stop and pull off the road into 
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a driveway a considerable distance south of the place she 
first struck the object, (Tr. 24-25). Defendant then 
attempted to back her car up to see what she had hit, and 
nearly collided with Deputy Sheriff Green, who was unaware 
of the accident and had been travelling two or three cars 
behind the Simons vehicle. There was no evidence as to how 
far behind the Simons vehicle Deputy Green was travelling. 
Mark Simons, the older of the two younger brothers of Jolene 
McBride discovered that the object hit was the plaintiff, 
Judith Johnson. He was in the right front seat at the time 
of the collision. (Tr. 25-26, 32). The two younger brothers 
of defendant, Jolene Simons, were the only other witnesses 
to the accident, but they were not called to testify. 
Plaintiff-respondent, Judith Johnson, at the time of the 
accident, was wearing a bright red parka. (Tr. 33, 40). The 
roadway was wet, but the weather was clear. Mrs. McBride 
testified that she had not observed snow until after she had 
stopped (Tr. 27); that her car lights were on, in good con-
dition and working; that the lights on the car immediately 
in front of her (approximately one (1) car length) were work-
ing; that her visability was not obstructed or obscured in any 
manner; and the lights from the oncoming cars, as well as the 
cars in front and behind her, illuminated the area. (Tr. 23, 
26, 28, 79). 
Plaintiff-respondent, Judith Johnson, suffered traumatic 
amnesia as a result of her injuries, and had no memory of the 
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accident, and for several days after the accident. (Tr. 63-
64). Miss Johnson testified that she recalled going to a 
friend's house on the afternoon of the accident. That she 
had walked home from her friend's house on prior occasions 
and would normally cross Highland Drive somewhere between the 
field and the Monte Cristo Condominiums so as to avoid having 
to negotiate Highland Drive where it is four-lanes north of the 
accident scene. (Tr. 72-74). The driver, Mrs. McBride, testi-
fied that she was familiar with the area, had driven by there 
before, had observed pedestrians in that area as late as the 
date of the accident, and knew that pedestrians walked along 
that stretch of the roadway. (Tr. 22). That at the precise 
moment of impact, the pedestrian appeared to be standing still, 
and was definitely to the right of her automobile. (Tr. 35). 
The driver, Mrs. McBride, testified that she was in the center 
of the southbound lane of traffic, near the center line, follow-
ing directly behind the vehicle in front of her, one (1) car 
length behind, approximately fifteen feet. Mr. Lord, plain-
tiffs' expert, testified that this was highly unlikely, and that 
the driver had changed the direction of her automobile from a 
straight-ahead to a left-to-right movement directly at the 
pedestrian, prior to impact. (Tr. 122-124). Mr. Knight, de-
fendants' expert, also testified that the Simons vehicle was 
in a different direction of travel than the car in front of 
her, and would have been to the right of the car immediately 
in front of her. (Tr. 162-164). 
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The evidence presented at trial indicated that the impact 
with the pedestrian occurred some place north of the driveway 
and west of the roadway in the asphalted area of the shoulder 
and driveway of the Monte Cristo Condominiums. The initial 
point of contact with the automobile was twelve (12) inches 
in on the right bumper; and that the victim travelled in a 
direct line over the car. That the pedestrian, at the time 
she was struck, was standing facing east. Mr. Lord testified 
that the probable point of impact was north of where the body 
of the pedestrian actually came to rest on the snowbank, and 
west of the road. The "exact" point he could not determine. 
(Tr. 123-130). 
Mr. Lord, plaintiffs' expert, testified that the seeable 
distance of the automobile with lights on low beam is 150 
feet; and on high beam 300 feet for an object on the road for 
proper alignment. That the pedestrian, Miss Johnson, standing 
at the edge of the roadway could be seen much farther than 150 
feet than an object laying on the roadway. 
Plaintiffs-respondents take issue with the statement con-
tained in the brief of defendants-appellants under the heading 
"Statement of Facts" on page 4, where they state their expert 
witness, Newell K. Knight, testified that the physical evidence 
would just as easily support the conclusion that the pedestrian 
was well into the travelled portion of the highway when hit, 
and refers to the transcript, pages 149-155. A reading of the 
testimony of Mr. Knight in the transcript at those pages clearly 
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reveals that Mr. Knight made no such statement. In fact, 
Mr. Knight testified that in a low speed accident, such as 
this accident, the pedestrian would move in the opposite 
direction of the force and could actually tumble and come 
almost to the spot where the pedestrian was originally when 
struck. (Tr. 152-153) . This clearly would establish the 
position of the pedestrian at or near the place where she was 
found west of and off the roadway in the asphalted area of the 
driveway in front of the Monte Cristo Condominiums. 
Plaintiffs-respondents also take issue with the statement 
of the defendants-appellants contained in their brief under the 
heading "Statement of Facts" on pages 4 and 5 thereof, that the 
lower court approved the right to make a record at a later time 
of counsel's exceptions to the jury instructions given by the 
court. On page 167 of the transcript, Mr. Poelman made his 
exceptions into the record, after the jury had retired to de-
liberate. In the supplemental transcript of the proceedings 
held before the lower court on October 6, 197 5, Judge Sawaya 
was under the impression that counsel for defendants-appellants 
had not had opportunity to make objections to the instructions 
of the court. The court was informed that Mr. Poelman had in 
fact had opportunity and had taken advantage of the opportunity 
and had made exceptions as shown by the transcript, pages 167-
169. The supplemental transcript does not indicate that Judge 
Sawaya in fact entered an order or granted leave to counsel for 
defendants-appellants to make additional exceptions to the in-
structions given and not given. (Supp. Tr. 28-30). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO GIVE DE-
FENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 19 WAS, IF 
ANYTHING, HARMLESS ERROR, AND NOT PREJUDICIAL TO 
DEFENDANTS' CASE WHERE THE INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN IN 
SUBSTANCE, MEETS THE REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW, AND THE 
SUBSTANCE OF THE INSTRUCTION WAS UNDERSTOOD BY THE 
JURY. 
Counsel for appellants urge that the alleged failure of 
the trial court to give the first part of the second sentence 
of its requested jury instruction number 19 was prejudicial 
error. The proffered instruction reads thus: 
"One who is guilty of contributory negligence 
may not recover from another for any injury 
suffered." (R. 92). 
Failure to give this instruction to the jury at all might have 
been prejudicial error, but it is acknowledged that the in-
struction was given in substance. (Appellants1 brief, page 5). 
That a jury instruction need only be given in substance is 
clear from cases cited by appellants. A close reading of 
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., 75 Utah 87, 283 P. 160, 166 
(1929), reveals that the court's actual holding was to the 
effect that the defendant was entitled to the substance of a 
contributory negligence instruction. In that case, the de-
fendants' proffered instructions on contributory negligence 
were inaccurate statements of law, but the Court held that 
they should have been given anyway, because they were the law 
in substance. 
Appellants quote from page 194 of Case v. Peterson, 17 
Wash.2d 523, 136 P.2d 192 (1934), to the effect that the Court 
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must define for the jury what contributory negligence is and 
what its effect should be on the verdict. It was further 
stated that it was error for the Court to not so instruct the 
jury. More interesting, however, is the paragraph directly 
following: 
"If the question rested here, we think the 
appellant would have good cause for complaint, 
but in view of other instructions given, the 
appellant was not prejudiced. " (Emphasis Added). 
The similarity to the instant case is striking. The actual 
instructions given in that case may be found on page 194, and 
those instructions, which were deemed sufficient, were probably 
not even as clear as those given in the instant case. (R. 126-
163) (R. 36) . 
Appellants seek to have the court consider the content of 
two affidavits attached to their brief as Appendix A and Ap-
pendix B. For reasons that will appear later, the statements 
found in those affidavits may not be used to impeach jury's ver-
dict. Nevertheless, the content of those affidavits seem to 
suggest that the jurors did substantially understand the law 
of contributory negligence. It is true, there is some evidence 
of confusion, but there is also much evidence to the contrary. 
In Appendix A, juror, Galen R. Coles, states his firm 
belief that none of the jurors understood the consequence of a 
finding of contributory negligence (paragraph 5). Besides the 
fact that this is inadmissible hearsay—Rule 56 (e) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence—it is clear from Appendix B affidavit (the 
enitre substantive content of which is also inadmissible), that 
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his firm belief was simply erroneous. In paragraph 11, speak-
ing of juror, Wayne Croft, Mr. Poelman says: 
"He further stated that he understood the in-
structions of the court to mean that if she was 
contributorily negligent no award of damages 
should be made to the plaintiffs, but that he 
disregarded that instruction and made an award of 
damages anyway because he knew that Miss Johnson 
had suffered a great deal." 
This juror unquestionably understood the law to be applied. 
Of perhaps even greater significance is the fact that he 
understood this from "the instructions of the court" and not 
from any independent understanding of the law, strongly sug-
gesting that the instructions were adequate. Paragraph 10 is 
also instructive: 
"I phoned him at home that evening and he said 
that he had come to the conclusion that the 
jury had not followed the instructions of the 
court and he felt terrible about it." 
Far from showing that the jurors did not understand the law, 
and the instructions, these two excerpts demonstrate that they 
did understand. Paragraph 10 is especially interesting be-
cause it involves a purported telephone conversation with 
juror, Galen R. Coles, the affiant of the affidavit of Appendix 
A. The claimed conversation took place on September 15, 1975, 
at which time he stated that the jury had not followed the 
court's instructions. Three days later, in the taking of the 
affidavit, things were slightly different. Now the jury is 
said to have not understood the court's instructions, which is 
a substantial deviation from the first statement indeed, and 
tends to cast a shadow over both documents. 
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In the affidavit of Appendix B, paragraph 8, the state-
ment of Karen L. Cannon is also instructive: 
"When I asked her whether she was aware that 
no money award should have been granted if 
both parties were negligent, she said that she 
and one of the male jurors thought that was the 
instruction and asked about it; that the jury 
foreman looked through the instructions and 
couldn't find anything to that effect; . . ." 
It is unfortunate that the discussion that took place in the 
jury room at that time is not available in its entirety. As 
previously noted, juror, Wayne Croft, fully understood the 
instruction and the law, and it is hard to believe that while 
the jury foreman was looking through the instructions, Mr. 
Croft would say nothing. 
It is acknowledged that the affidavits contain some evidence 
of misunderstanding, but the evidence that the jurors understood 
is at least as strong, if not stronger. At best, the affidavits 
are inconclusive of the proposition that the instructions were 
inadequate, and are an attempt to impeach the jury's verdict 
contrary to law. (See memorandum of plaintiffs-respondents, 
R. 41-46). 
Where, as in this case, the language of the instructions 
to the jury is such that the issues are understandable, and 
facts are ascertainable to resolve issues, the trial court's 
failure to give instructions requested by defendants will not 
constitute reversible error. (Shupe v. Menlove, 18 U.2d 130, 
417 P.2d 246 (1966). The record shows the issues in this case 
were understandable and the factual evidence was ascertainable 
to resolve the issues. Thus, the failure to give defendants-
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appellants requested instruction, was at most, if anything, 
harmless error, and did not constitute reversible error. In 
Lamb v. Bangart, U.2d , 525 P.2d 602 (1974), the Court 
said: 
"Although in any lawsuit of several days duration 
counsel can usually find matters upon which he 
may claim error, reviewing court will not reverse 
on mere error but only if it be substantial and 
prejudicial to the extent that there is a reason-
able likelihood that unfairness or injustice has 
resulted." 
Both parties had fair and full opportunity to present their 
contentions and evidence supporting them to the court and the 
jury. Both parties had sufficient opportunity to make excep-
tions in the record to the instructions given or not given, 
and all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the verdict 
and judgment. (Rowley v. Graven Brothers, 26 U.2d 448, 491 
P.2d 1206; Burnson v. Strong, 17 U.2d 364, 412 P.2d 451; Gordon 
v. Provo City, 15 U.2d 287, 319 P.2d 430). 
In reviewing the record as a whole, the failure of the 
trial court to give defendants-appellants requested instruction 
was not error; or if considered to be error, was at most, harm-
less error. The verdict of the jury should not be overturned 
and should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
A JURY MAY NOT IMPEACH ITS VERDICT BY AFFIDAVIT. 
The law in Utah on jury impeachment by affidavit is set 
forth in Rule 59(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as 
follows: 
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"Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one 
or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or 
to a finding on any question submitted to them 
by the court, by resort to a determination by 
chance, or as a result of bribery, such mis-
conduct may be proved by the affidavit of any 
one of the jurors." 
In the instant case, there is no claim of a determina-
tion by chance, nor is there any claim of bribery. The statute 
says nothing of allowing a jury to impeach its verdict on the 
basis of the deliberations or mental processes of jury members. 
It is clear then that this case does not come within the pur-
view of the statute. 
The law on the subject is further delineated by Rule 41 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence as follows: 
"Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict 
or an indictment no evidence shall be received 
to show the effect of any statement, conduct, 
event or condition upon the mind of a juror as 
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the 
verdict or indictment or concerning the mental 
processes by which it was determined, except as 
provided in Rule 59, U.R.C.P." 
That the statutory grounds alone can be invoked as an exception 
to the general rule, and that the deliberations and mental pro-
cesses of the jurors cannot be inquired into, is also clear 
from the case law. In Hathway v. Marx, 21 U.2d 33, 439 P.2d 
850, 851 (1968), the Court said in language that seems ap-
propriate in the present case the following: 
"First, there is no competent proof that the 
alleged misconduct happened at all. Second, 
with very limited exceptions, the conduct and 
deliberations in the jury room cannot be im-
peached. " 
See also Elite Cleaners and Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 
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784 (1973). An expecially interesting case is Santilli v. 
Pueblo, 511 P.2d 928, 929 (Col. Ct. App. 1973), which involved 
an omitted instruction, must like the present case, and its 
omission was deemed by the Court to be harmless error. Actually, 
the similarities between that case and this case, although the 
cases are not identical, are striking. In reaching its de-
cision, the Court had this to say: 
"Following the trial, one of the jurors gave the 
Santillis' attorney an affidavit stating that 
the jury as a whole, during its deliberations, 
was confused in applying some of the law to 
portions of the facts. Such an affidavit is not 
grounds for the granting of a new trial or for a 
reversal of the judgment entered. A verdict can-
not be impeached by the affidavit of a juror." 
Respondents do not understand appellants' reliance on the 
cases cited on pages 15-17 of their brief. A casual reading 
of those cases shows that they do not support appellants1 posi-
tion at all. The excerpt from Moulton v. Staats, 83 Utah 197, 
27 P.2d 455 (1933) found on page 15 of appellants' brief, re-
veals that his case did not even involve an impeachment of a 
jury verdict. Actually, the reason the verdict was modified 
in that case was because it had not been correctly expressed 
by the jury. The agreement reached by the jury did not agree 
with the written paper filed. Since in the present case, 
appellants have made no claim that there was a mistake in 
transmission, nor are appellants asking for mere modification 
of the verdict, the cited case is plainly inapplicable. Appel-
lants' quote from Brown v. Johnson, 24 U.2d 388, 472 P.2d 942 
(1970) merely reaffirms this. An affidavit from a juror may 
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explain a verdict, but it cannot impeach it. 
Appellants next cite Wellman v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350, 366 
P.2d 701, 703-04 (1961). That case clearly stands for the 
proposition that a trial court, in its discretion, may order 
a new trial when it appears that, "it seems clear that the jury 
has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts; or 
misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence ***." The criteria ob-
served on appellate review are not the same as those on the 
trial court level. This is stated precisely in this case: 
"The trial court has a broad discretion in ruling 
on such a motion which we should not disturb 
unless there is a plain abuse thereof. We apply 
a different rule in determining whether this 
court on appeal should grant a new trial and 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
granting a new trial." 
The Court had this to say on the rule to be applied on re-
viewing lower court rulings on motions for new trial: 
"However, since the trial judge has seen and heard 
the witnesses and had a first-hand view of all of 
the evidence, and the proceedings throughout the 
trial and has ruled on the admissibility of the 
evidence, and instructed the jury on the law gov-
erning their verdict, and had opportunity of 
observing the tactics of the counsel throughout 
the trial and the jury's reaction thereto, his 
ruling on a motion for a new trial should not be 
overruled unless it clearly appears that he has 
abused his discretion." 
Finally, it should be noted that this case also did not involve 
impeachment of a jury verdict, but rather, a motion for a new 
trial because it was felt that the jury's verdict went against 
the weight of the evidence. 
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Of all the cases cited in this portion of appellants' 
brief, the case of Hunter v. Smallwood, 328 N.E.2d 344 (111. 
App. 1975) comes closest to being in point. But a close read-
ing, and a comparison with the facts of the present case, show 
that it likewise does not offer appellants much confort. 
First, the portion omitted from appellants' brief: 
"The sensitive jury deliberations and the thought 
processes of the jury should not be thrown out in 
the open and picked apart, otherwise no trial 
would ever be safe from attack." 
Second, it should be noted that this case was decided by an 
inferior court of another state. Third, it would seem that 
this case stands for the proposition that two exceptions to 
the rule against jury impeachment of a verdict are (1) where 
the jury is hopelessly confused, and (2) where the verdict as 
recorded did not agree with the verdict reached. As to point 
(1), a reading of the affidavits in a light most favorable to 
appellants does not show hopeless confusion. At best, such a 
reading shows that some of the jurors at one time raised a 
question about the meaning of the instructions. It might well 
be asked, what jury doesn't experience some confusion at some 
point during their deliberations? As to point (2), it cannot 
be said of the present case that the verdict rendered and re-
corded does not agree with the one agreed upon. In the cited 
case, the jurors' affidavits showed that the jury intended to 
deny recovery, but granted recovery instead. In the present 
case, appellants assert that the jury reached its verdict as a 
result of a misunderstanding of the law, which is quite a 
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different thing indeed. 
At the outset of Point III of appellants1 brief, appellants 
acknowledge that the instant case comes within the rules gov-
erning impeachment of jury verdicts by affidavit. It is alleged 
that the cases cited illustrate examples of exceptions to the 
rules. That there are exceptions is not questioned. Respondents 
simply maintain that three of the four cases cited have nothing 
to do with impeachment, and the exceptions noted in the fourth 
case are inapplicable in the instant case. The evidence in 
this case clearly supported the verdict of the jury and the 
verdict was not predicated upon misconduct of the jury or by 
resort to a determination by chance. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ALLEGED FAILURE TO READ JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1-A 
TO THE JURY. 
Appellants claim prejudicial error through the trial court's 
clerical oversight in not reading the instruction on passion and 
prejudice to the jury. To sustain this point, it would appear 
that appellants must prove two (2) things. First, they must 
show that the jury was denied the instruction, and second, 
they must show that such denial was prejudicial to their case, 
or else it must be dismissed as harmless error. It appears from 
both the transcript and the case law that appellants can meet 
neither burden. 
That a failure or refusal to give instructions may be 
cured or waived seems to be the law. 89 C.J.S. Trial §671 (1955). 
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Appellants called the oversight to the courtfs attention, and 
agreed that their own (appellants) reading of the instruction 
would be sufficient. (Appellants1 brief, page 21). A closely 
related case is Rosics v. Grant, 174 N.Y.S.2d 82 (App. Div. 
1958), wherein the court, in ruling on a similar issue said: 
"After the court had finished its instruction 
to the jury, the attorney for the defendant 
took exception to that part of the charge and 
the court immediately explained to the jury 
that the wording was improper and that they 
should use their common sense, after which court 
said to counsel "Does that take care of that? 
Mr. Kramer: Yes. The court: All right." Under 
these circumstances the defendant has no justi-
fiable complaint with reference to that part of 
the case." 
In the instant case, the appellants' counsel agreed that his 
own reading of the instruction would "take care of that", and 
there is no reason why the outcome should be any different. 
(Supp. Tr. 3). It is a recognized rule of law that a party 
who takes a position which either leads a court into error, or 
by conduct approves the error committed by the court, cannot 
later take advantage of such error in procedure. (Helman v. 
Patterson, 121 Utah 332, 241 P.2d 910, 913; Ludlow v. Colorado 
Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347, 354). 
Defendants-appellants were in complete agreement with the manner 
in which the lower court submitted instruction 1-A, and cannot 
now be heard to complain. 
Our inquiry might easily end here, but the cases on passion 
and prejudice are very revealing. A perceptive reading of those 
cases show that passions and prejudice always goes to the issue 
of amount of damages and is a question of liability. Since 
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appellants have not alleged that the amount of damages is 
excessive in the present case, it would appear that their 
argument must fail as a matter of law. A few cases from other 
jurisdictions are here cited. Schaefer v. Trans American 
Freight Lines, 173 S.W.2d 20, 23 (1943); Tunnel Mining and 
Leasing Company v. Cooper, 115 P. 901, 903 (1911); Ries v. 
Cheyenne Cabin Transfer Company, 79 P.2d 468, 474 (1938). 
Utah is no exception, thus, in Hansen v. General Builders 
Supply Company, 15 U.2d 143, 389 P.2d 61, 62 (1964), the Court 
said: 
"General damages of $22,500.00 were awarded by 
the jury, which to you or me might seem somewhat 
exaggerated, and, depending on any one elses per-
sonal opinion, may have been poor judgment on the 
part of the veniremen. The urgence on appeal, how-
ever, is that the verdict reflected passion and 
prejudice against the defendants. There is noth-
ing in the record that would justify this court 
in arriving at such a conclusion." 
Should we be overly surprised to find that this is exactly 
what the pertinent Utah Statute says on the subject? Rule 59 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs new trials. As 
grounds for new trials, 59(a) (5) reads as follows: 
"Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion 
and prejudice." 
The jury was given the instruction on passion and prejudice, 
appellants acquiesced in the manner in which the instruction was 
given, and no prejudice was shown, since it is not alleged that 
damages were excessive, in that the matter of passion and preju-
dice goes only to damages by case law and by statute. Appellants 
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should be granted neither reversal nor new trial on this point. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED NEITHER TO SUBMIT THE 
ISSUES TO THE JURY ON A SPECIAL VERDICT, NOR TO SUMMON 
A JURY PANEL, NOR TO GRANT APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
Appellants cite the case of Baker v. Cook, 6 U.2d 161, 
308 P.2d 264, 267 (1957) in the brief on page 14 to an effect 
that a special verdict should be used in some cases. This 
does no violence to the principal that the decision rests 
with the trial court, to be overturned only on a clear showing 
of abuse of the court's discretion. Whether or not there was 
any such abuse should be determined from the record and the 
previous points of law discussed in this brief. There has been 
no showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court 
by appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
The alleged failure of the trial court to give defendants1 
requested instruction did not constitute reversible error, and 
was, if anything, harmless error and not prejudicial to defend-
ants1 case where the instruction was given in substance; met the 
requirements of law; and the substance of the instruction was 
understood by the jury. The evidence in this case clearly sup-
ports the verdict and the verdict is not predicated upon mis-
conduct of the jury; or by resort to a determination by chance; 
or the awarding of excessive damages appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion and prejudice. Therefore, 
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the request of defendants-appellants to summon the jury panel 
in connection with their motion for new trial was nothing more 
than an attempt to impeach the jury verdict by affidavits of 
the jurors, which was clearly contrary to law; and the refusal 
of the lower court to summon the jury panel and to grant the 
motion for new trial was proper and not error. Defendants-
appellants1 approval of the manner in which the lower court sub-
mitted instruction 1-A to the jury, and their own reading of 
the instruction to the jury, leaves them without justifiable 
complaint, and certainly without claim of error on the part of 
the lower court. The refusal of the lower court to submit the 
issues to the jury on special verdict was discretionary, and 
where there has been no showing of abuse of discretion, all 
presumptions are in favor of the validity of the verdict and 
the judgment. The verdict and the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
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